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SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
PUBLIC EDUCATION: TOWARD A
COMPREHENSIVE BALANCING TEST
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of teachers' associations1 and the enactment of state
public employment laws2 have given teachers a more powerful voice in
decisions that affect their working conditions. Thirty-three states have
passed public employment relations acts (PERAs) which grant teach-
ers and other public employees the right to bargain with their employ-
ers.3 The scope clauses of these laws indicate which topics are
1. Teachers' unionism has experienced rapid growth in the last two decades. See
Finch & Nagel, Collective Bargaining in the Public Schools: Reassessing Labor Policy in
an Era of Reform, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1573, 1580. The authors indicate that 88% of the
nation's school teachers are members of either the National Education Association
(NEA) or the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). Id. See generally A. CRES-
WELL & M. MURPHY, TEACHERS, UNIONS, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION 53-103 (1980); Gee, The Unionization of Mr. Chips: A Survey Analysis of
Collective Bargaining in the Public Schools, 15 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 367, 374-80
(1979).
2. These statutes are typically entitled the Public Employment Relations Act
(Michigan, Iowa) or Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act (Florida, Oregon).
They apply to firemen, policemen, and other state or municipal employees. In addition,
a number of states have enacted statutes pertaining specifically to public school teach-
ers. See, eg., Meeting and Negotiating in Public Educational Employment, CAL.
GoV'T CODE §§ 3540-3549 (West Supp. 1988); Arbitration of School Teacher Disputes,
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.3-1 to -16 (1986); Labor Relations for Teachers, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1981-2010 (1982). See infra note 3 (for a complete listing of statutes).
3. Public sector collective bargaining acts are also a relatively recent development.
Prior to 1965, only three states, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Connecticut, allowed public
sector bargaining. Since the late 1960s, however, a majority of the states have enacted
laws granting this right. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.550 (1987); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 3512 (West Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153a (West Supp. 1988);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4001 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.201 (West Supp.
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negotiable and typically mandate bargaining as to "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment."4 The scope-of-bargaining
debate focuses on the proper interpretation of these statutory
provisions.'
1987); HAW. REv. STAT. § 89-1 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 20.9 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 48, para. 1701 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-3 (Bums Supp.
1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.9 (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5414
(1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965 (West Supp. 1988); MD. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 6-408 (1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 2 (Law. Co-op 1976); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215 (West 1978); MINN. STAT. § 179A.01 (1984); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-31-305 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-214 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 288.150 (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:3 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-
6 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 15-38.1-12 (1981); OHIO RFv. CODE ANN. § 4117.04 (Anderson Supp. 1987);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 509.2 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REv. STAT. § 243.656
(1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.1 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAws § 36-11-
7 (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 3-18-2 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-501
(1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2001 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.59.060
(West Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.825 (West Supp. 1988).
4. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (scope provi-
sion of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)).
Twenty-seven states have adopted some variation of the phrase "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment" into the scope provisions of their collective
bargaining acts. See, eg., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.2 (West Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, para. 1704 (Smith-Hurd 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West
Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.91 (West Supp. 1987).
5. The primary responsibility for interpreting scope provisions usually rests with the
state's public employment relations boards (PERBs). Courts often concede that scope
determinations are classic issues for PERB's expertise and frequently defer to their deci-
sions. Scope disputes normally reach the courts in the form of judicial review of an
administrative agency decision. The court's inquiry is therefore limited to whether the
board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or contrary to law. See, e.g.,
Clark County School Dist. v. Local Gov't, 90 Nev. 442, 446, 530 P.2d 114, 117 (1974)
("Unless the board should act arbitrarily beyond administrative boundaries, the court
must give credence to the findings of the board."); Kansas Bd. of Regents v. Pittsburgh
State Univ. Chapter of Kansas-NEA, 233 Kan. 801, 820, 667 P.2d 306, 320 (1983)
(same).
The scope debate focuses primarily on the proper interpretation of the vague lan-
guage "terms and conditions of employment." See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (landmark Supreme Court case examining the
proper scope of the NLRA provision).
Commentary exploring the scope of bargaining for public employees includes: Devel-
opments in the Law - Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1611, 1682-1700 (1984)
[hereinafter Developments]; H. EDWARDS, LABOR RELATION LAW IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 293469 (1985); Corbett, Determining the Scope of Public Sector Collective Bar-
gaining: A New Look Via a Balancing Formula, 40 MONT. L. REv. 231 (1979);
Sackman, Redefining the Scope of Bargaining in Public Employment, 19 B.C.L. REV.
155 (1977).
For commentary specifically addressing the scope of bargaining debate in the field of
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Courts facing scope-of-bargaining disputes, whether in the public or
private sector, must reconcile the fundamental tension between the em-
ployer's right to make managerial decisions and the employees' right to
bargain over working conditions.6 In the public sector, however,
courts must also consider the employer's role as an elected official and
the public's interest in efficient public services and an effective voice in
the political decision-making process.7 Defining the scope of collective
bargaining, therefore, requires the court to balance the interests of em-
ployers, employees, and the voting public.'
This Note examines the scope of collective bargaining in the public
sector, focusing on scope disputes in public education. Section II de-
scribes the bargaining process and presents examples of typical state
collective bargaining acts. Section III reviews the basic theories that
influence judicial interpretation of bargaining statutes. Section IV ex-
amines judicial approaches to bargaining topics that simultaneously
pertain to working conditions and management rights. Finally, section
V advocates a comprehensive balancing approach that acknowledges
competing interests and provides a practical framework for resolving
disputes.
public education, see, e.g., Note, Scope of Negotiations and Teacher/School District Con-
tracts After Rapid City Education Association v. Rapid City Area School District No. 51-
4, 32 S.D.L. REV. 126 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Scope of Negotiations after Rapid City];
Finch & Nagel, Collective Bargaining in the Public Schools: Reassessing Labor Policy in
an Era of Reform, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1573, 1578-83; Note, Mandatory Subjects of Bar-
gaining Under the Kansas Public Employer-Employee Relations Act, 32 U. KAN. L.
REV. 697 (1984); Bowles, Defining the Scope of Bargainingfor Teacher Negotiations: A
Study of Judicial Approaches, 29 LAB. L.J. 649 (1978); Nelson, State Court Interpreta-
tion of Teacher Collective Bargaining Statutes: Four Approaches to the Scope of Bargain-
ing Issue, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 421 (1977); Tepper & Melberg, Scope of Bargaining for
Teachers in California Public Schools, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 885 (1978).
See infra note 54 (listing commentary specifically addressing the political implications
of public sector collective bargaining).
For commentary addressing the scope of bargaining in the private sector, see Note,
Subjects of Bargaining Under the NLRA and the Limits of Liberal Political Imagination,
97 HARv. L. REv. 475 (1983); Harper, Leveling the Road From Borg-Warner to First
National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REv. 1447
(1982).
6. See generally Corbett, supra note 5.
7. See infra note 54 (listing commentary addressing the problem of public sector
collective bargaining disrupting the democratic decision-making process); see infra
notes 55-67 and accompanying text (discussing cases adopting the political process doc-
trine to limit the scope of public sector bargaining).
8. See infra notes 139-55 and accompanying text (discussing comprehensive balanc-
ing formulas that reconcile a variety of competing interests).
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II. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACTS
A. The Private Sector Model
State legislatures have looked to section 8(d) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)9 for guidance when drafting the scope provi-
sions of their collective bargaining acts.10 These provisions generally
contain some form of the key phrase "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment."" Slight variations in the statutory
language, however, can imply a narrower or a broader scope of bar-
gaining.' 2 Proposals falling within this statutory language are
mandatory subjects of bargaining. 3 Both parties are obligated to ne-
gotiate in good faith 4 with respect to mandatory subjects and may
insist upon their positions to the point of impasse.' If an employer
9. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935
as the primary federal legislation governing collective bargaining in the private sector.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
10. See supra note 4 (listing representative scope provisions modeled after § 8(d) of
the NLRA).
11. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215 (West 1979) (containing lan-
guage identical to § 8(d) of NLRA); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1607 (Smith-Hurd
1985) (providing that the employer and the exclusive employee representative have a
duty to negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment).
12. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-4 (Burns 1985) (restricting bargaining to
"salary, wages, hours, and salary and wage-related fringe benefits") with ALASKA STAT.
§ 14.20.550 (1987) (allowing negotiations on "matters pertaining to employment and
the fulfillment of professional duties").
13. The separation of bargaining topics into two categories-mandatory and per-
missive-derives from the Supreme Court opinion in NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). Justice Burton, writing for the majority, identified
the mandatory category by reading NLRA § 8(a)(5), which makes an employer's re-
fusal to bargain an unfair labor practice, in conjunction with § 8(d), which calls for
bargaining on the subjects of wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.
See infra notes 23-26 (discussing the permissive category).
14. See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982); see generally THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT 271-309 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
15. Employers and employees may condition their consent to a final contract agree-
ment upon satisfactory resolution of mandatory issues. If no agreement is reached, they
may invoke impasse procedures such as arbitration or review before a Public Employ-
ment Relations Board (PERB). Private sector employees may strike over mandatory
issues, but most states prohibit strikes by public employees. See infra note 100 (listing
state no-strike provisions); see Nelson, supra note 5, at 426; see generally Anderson,
Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 943 (1969).
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refuses to negotiate,1 6 or if he acts unilaterally without consulting the
bargaining representative, he may be charged with an unfair labor
practice. 17
State legislatures have also incorporated private sector case law into
the scope provisions of their public employment acts.18 Specifically,
many states include a management rights provision exempting certain
items from the collective bargaining process. 9 These clauses typically
provide that managerial policy decisions such as the hiring, firing, and
promotion of employees shall not be considered mandatory subjects of
bargaining.2" Some state courts consider management or policy deci-
16. See, eg., School Dist. of Drummond v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 121 Wis. 2d 126, 358 N.W.2d 285 (1984) (school district's failure to bargain
over antinepotism policy, which was a mandatory topic, constituted a prohibited prac-
tice under Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11 1.70(3Xa)(4) (West Supp. 1988)).
17. Refusals to negotiate may also result in a court order to negotiate. Unilateral
action taken by an employer on a mandatory topic may result in a court order to restore
the status quo ante. Nelson, supra note 5, at 426. See, e.g., Kent County Educ.
Ass'n/Cedar Springs Educ. Ass'n v. Cedar Springs Pub. Schools, 157 Mich. App. 59,
403 N.W.2d 494 (1987) (board's unilateral action in changing hours without notice to
bargaining unit constituted an unfair labor practice).
18. The leading private sector cases are: NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (developing mandatory and permissive bargaining catego-
ries); Chemical Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971)
(permissive categories); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964)
(developing management rights category).
19. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-9(d) (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.07
(West Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:l(xi) (Supp. 1987); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Purdon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-303 (Supp.
1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(c) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
The NLRA contains no equivalent "management rights" clause. This doctrine is
derived from Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stew-
art, J., concurring). Justice Stewart stated that certain managerial decisions "funda-
mental to the basic direction of the corporate enterprise" lie outside the scope of
mandatory bargaining. Id.
20. For example, IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.7 (West 1987) provides:
Public employers shall have ... the exclusive power, duty, and the right to: 1.
Direct the work of its public employees. 2. Hire, promote, demote, transfer, assign
and retain public employees in positions within the public agency. 3. Suspend or
discharge public employees for proper cause. 4. Maintain the efficiency of govern-
mental operations. 5. Relieve public employees from duties because of lack of
work or for other legitimate reasons. 6. Determine and implement methods,
means, assignments and personnel by which the public employers' operations are
to be conducted. 7. Take such actions as may be necessary to carry out the mission
of the public employer. 8. Initiate, prepare, certify, and administer its budget. 9.
Exercise all powers and duties granted to the public employer by law.
Id.
1989]
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sions to be prohibited subjects of bargaining.2 In this case, neither the
employer nor the employee is permitted to negotiate, and any contrac-
tual agreement which includes them is unenforceable.22
Most states define bargaining proposals that do not fall within the
mandatory category as "permissive." Consequently, most cases in-
volve characterizing a topic as either mandatory or permissive.23
Parties are permitted but not required to bargain over permissive sub-
jects, 24 but neither side may insist to impasse.25 Employers may act
unilaterally with regard to permissive items, but if they agree to include
such topics in a bargaining agreement, they must honor them.
26
B. Enumerated List Statutes
Several states have enacted statutes specifically listing mandatory
subjects, 27 apparently to avoid continuing dispute over the scope is-
21. Courts adopting the nondelegation theory, such as New Jersey, recognize only
mandatory and nonnegotiable categories of bargaining. School officials may not bargain
away subjects which are considered matters of delegated governmental authority. See,
eg., Teaneck Bd. of Educ. v. Teaneck Teachers Ass'n, 94 N.J. 9, 14, 462 A.2d 137, 139
(1983); Board of Educ. of the Woodstown Pilesgrove School Dist. v. Woodstown Piles-
grove Educ. Ass'n, 81 N.J. 582, 588 n.1, 410 A.2d 1131, 1134 n.1 (1980).
22. Developments, supra note 5, at 1685.
23. See, eg., Wisc. STAT. ANN.§ 11 1.70(1)(a) (West Supp. 1988) (matters reserved
to management and direction of the governmental unit are permissive). Iowa courts
have interpreted the Iowa collective bargaining statute to include only mandatory and
permissive categories. See Aplington Community School Dist. v. Iowa Public Employ-
ment Relations Bd. 392 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Iowa 1986).
24. The permissive category also derives from NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). After identifying mandatory subjects of bargaining,
Justice Burton stated: "As to other matters, however, each party is free to bargain or
not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree." Id. at 349.
25. See, eg., Orange County Police Benev. Ass'n v. City of Casselberry, 457 So. 2d
1125, 1128-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (City's insistence to point of impasse upon a
permissive topic - the exclusion of disputes regarding discharge and demotion from
the grievance procedure - constituted an unfair labor practice).
26. See, eg., Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Vecchia, 90 Pa. Commw. 235,
245, 494 A.2d 1151, 1157 (1985) ("Once a public employer has entered into an agree-
ment concerning matters of managerial prerogative regarding which there is no obliga-
tion to bargain, the employer will be bound.").
27. See The Professional Negotiations Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5413(L) (1985)
(defining "conditions of employment" with a list of enumerated items); The Public Em-
ployer-Employee Relations Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4322(t) (1984) (defining "con-
ditions of employment" for nonprofessional public employees); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 288.150 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.9 (West Supp. 1987); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 3543.2(a) (West Supp. 1988).
For example, IOWA CODE § 20.9 provides:
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sue.2" Some state legislatures intend their lists to be exclusive,29 while
others suggest the list is merely representational."0 Also important is
whether courts interpret the statutory language broadly or narrowly.31
The distinctions between these approaches become evident when courts
encounter a proposal that does not fall squarely within the list.32
The public employer and the employee representative shall... negotiate in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, vacations, insurance, holidays, leaves of absence,
shift differentials, overtime compensation, supplemental pay, seniority, transfer
procedures, job classifications, health and safety matters, evaluation procedures,
procedures for staff reduction, in-service training, and other matters mutually
agreed on.
Id.
28. The number of cases in these states' courts, however, does not suggest the enu-
merated list statute approach reduces litigation. Recent scope of bargaining cases in
Iowa include: Northeast Community School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd.
(PERB), 408 N.W.2d 46 (Iowa 1987) (public employee organization's proposal to
school district concerning teacher evaluation procedures and grievance procedures con-
stitutes mandatory subject of bargaining); Aplington Community School Dist. v. Iowa
PERB, 392 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 1986) (teachers' association's proposed factors for
teacher evaluations were encompassed within term "evaluation procedures" and thus
were mandatory); Professional Staff Ass'n of Area Educ. Agency 12 v. PERB, 373
N.W.2d 516, 519 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (reimbursement for unused sick leave did not
fall within "wages" or "supplemental pay" contained in enumerated list of mandatory
topics); Saydel Educ. Ass'n v. PERB, 333 N.W.2d 486, 489 (Iowa 1983) (section 20.9
requires bargaining on a broad range of teacher qualifications bearing on transfer or
reduction decisions).
29. For example, the Nevada scope provision begins, "The scope of mandatory bar-
gaining shall be limited to . . . " a list of enumerated items. NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 288.150(2) (1987). Although Nevada provides an extensive list of mandatory items,
the introductory language may confine bargaining exclusively to those items listed.
30. The Oregon scope provision provides, "'Employment relations' includes, but is
not limited to, matters concerning direct or indirect monetary benefits, hours, vacations,
sick leave, grievance procedures, and other conditions of employment." OR. RnV. STAT.
§ 243.650(7) (1983). Although the Oregon statute lists far fewer mandatory items, the
expansive language "is not limited to" and "matters concerning" allows courts greater
discretion to hold unenumerated items mandatory. See, ag., Springfield Educ. Ass'n v.
Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 290 Or. 217, 621 P.2d 547 (1980) (legislature chose to
define employment relations by example to allow Board to include other subjects of like
character).
3 1. This question involves deciding whether a bargaining proposal falls within the
definition of an enumerated item. The Nevada statute, for example, includes "safety,"
which could be read broadly to include bargaining over student disciplinary policy. See
Bowles, supra note 5, at 653.
32. This problem illustrates the inflexibility of list statutes, especially the exclusive
lists, which give courts limited discretion to evolve their decision making in accordance
with changes in the workplace, absent the burdensome process of continual statutory
amendment. Id.
1989]
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The California Educational Employment Relation Act (EERA)33 at-
tempts to avoid scope disputes by listing mandatory items and reserv-
ing all other topics to the discretion of the public school employer.3 4
Nevertheless, in San Mateo City School District v. Public Employment
Relations Board,3 5 the California Supreme Court, relying on statutory
language in the scope provision that allowed negotiation on matters
"relating to" wages, hours, and other terms of employment, 36 held that
unenumerated items could be subject to mandatory bargaining.37 Simi-
larly, in Unified School District No. 501 v. Secretary of Kansas Depart-
ment of Human Resources,38 the Kansas Supreme Court held that
proposals falling "within the purview" of enumerated items in their list
statute were mandatorily negotiable.39
33. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3540-49 (West Supp. 1988).
34. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.2(a) (West Supp. 1988).
35. 33 Cal. 3d 850, 663 P.2d 523, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1983). The San Mateo City
School District petitioned for a review of a finding by PERE that it had committed an
unfair labor practice by refusing to negotiate on certain teacher association proposals,
even though the proposals were not specifically enumerated in the list of mandatory
subjects. Id. at 853, 663 P.2d at 525, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
36. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3543.2(a) (West Supp. 1988). This provision contains lan-
guage similar to § 8(d) of the NLRA and an enumerated list of items. The court relied
on the former, which provides: "The scope of representation shall be limited to matters
relating to wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment." Id. (emphasis added). The court found that the inclusion of this broad lan-
guage, rather than the adoption of an exclusive list of negotiable items, implied that the
legislature intended to grant PERB some flexibility when making scope determinations.
33 Cal. 3d at 858-59, 663 P.2d at 528, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 805. See infra note 147 (dis-
cussing the court's deference to PERB's construction of scope provision language).
37. 33 Cal. 3d at 862, 663 P.2d at 531, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 808. The court upheld the
reasonableness of PERB's interpretation, which emphasized the expansive language
"matters relating to" and deemphasized the restrictive language "shall be limited to."
Id. The court held that the reservation of unenumerated items to the employer was not
intended to eliminate the flexibility provided by the "matters relating to" language. Id.
For additional discussion of the scope provision of California's EERA, see
Mathiason, Scope of Bargaining: The Management Perspective, 18 SANTA CLARA L.
,Ev. 861 (1978); Tepper & Melberg, Scope of Bargaining for Teachers in California's
Public Schools, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 885 (1978); Herman, Scope of Representation
Under the Rodda Act: Negotiable and Non-negotiable Issues, 32 CPER 14 (1977).
38. 235 Kan. 968, 685 P.2d 874 (1984). The school district appealed a decision
which held proposals regarding access to employee files and the mechanics of staff re-
duction and student teacher programs to be mandatorily negotiable.
39. Id. at 969, 685 P.2d at 875. The court adopted a topics approach which does
not require a proposed item to be specifically listed under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-
5413(L) (1985) in order for the court to find it mandatorily negotiable. Accordingly,
the court held that access to employees' files and the mechanics of staff reduction fell
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol36/iss1/8
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Iowa courts have been more reluctant to find unenumerated topics
bargainable. Iowa courts characterize their list statute as exclusive and
read the statutory language literally.' In Fort Dodge Community
School District v. Public Employment Relations Board,4 1 the Iowa
Supreme Court defined "wages" as "pay given for labor."42 The court
concluded that because cash incentives for early retirement could not
be considered wages, the topic was not mandatorily negotiable. 3
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING STATUTES
A. Narrowing the Scope of Bargaining
1. Managerial Prerogative
The "management rights" or "managerial prerogative" theory is the
most common rationale courts employ to limit the scope of collective
within the purview of "termination and nonrenewal of contracts" and "reemployment."
235 Kan. at 971-74, 685 P.2d at 878-79.
See also Kansas Bd. of Regents v. Pittsburgh State Univ. Chapter of Kansas-NEA,
233 Kan. 801, 667 P.2d 306 (1983). This case involved an action brought under a
similar statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4322(t) (1985). The court held that the legisla-
ture did not intend the enumerated list of subjects to be literal, but that school officials
must negotiate all items which relate to the enumerated subjects. 233 Kan. at 821, 667
P.2d at 317. For a discussion of the latter case, see Note, Mandatory Subject of Bargain-
ing Under the Kansas Public Employer-Employee Relations Act, 32 KAN. L. REv. 697
(1984).
See also National Educ. Ass'n-Kansas City v. Unified School Dist. No. 500, 4 Kan.
563, 608 P.2d 415 (1980) (proposal regarding number of required after-hours faculty
meetings, grade card preparation time, and duty-free planning period mandatory as
within hours and amount of work); Chee-Craw Teachers Ass'n v. Unified School Dist.
No. 247, 225 Kan. 561, 593 P.2d 406 (1979) (length of workday, arrival and departure
times, number of teaching periods, and duty-free lunch are mandatory topics).
40. Iowa courts first articulated this restrictive reading in City of Fort Dodge v.
Iowa PERB, 275 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1979). Looking to the legislative history, the court
noted that while the original version of § 20.9 allowed bargaining for "other terms and
conditions of employment," the final bill excluded this language and adopted a specific
list. The court concluded that the legislature intended a strict, exclusive interpretation.
Id. at 398. See supra note 27 (Iowa's list statute).
41. 319 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1982).
42. Id at 183.
43. Id at 183-84. Noting that the legislature had declined to make any statutory
changes subsequent to the court's restrictive reading in prior cases, the court again
adopted a literal reading of § 20.9. Id at 183.
See supra note 28 (for additional Iowa holdings). See generally Pope, Analysis of the
Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, 24 DRAKE L. RaV. 1 (1974).
1989]
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bargaining. Borrowing from private sector case law,44 courts adopting
this theory45 hold that management should be free to make decisions
that are "fundamental to the basic direction of the corporate enter-
prise.",46 This theory suggests that an employer can make managerial
decisions more efficiently and effectively without collective bargain-
ing.47 Many state public employment statutes include a management
rights clause.48 In addition, courts frequently use the "managerial pre-
rogative" theory to deny mandatory bargaining.49
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in West Hartford Education Asso-
ciation v. DeCourcy,5° observed that in the context of public education,
educational policy was the equivalent of managerial policy."1 The
court held that decisions fundamental to the existence, direction, and
operation of the school enterprise fall outside the scope of bargaining.5 2
The court concluded that school district decisions regarding the estab-
lishment of extracurricular programs were matters of educational pol-
icy and therefore were excluded from the scope of mandatory
bargaining. 53
44. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
45. See, eg., Board of Educ. of School Dist. for City of Detroit v. Parks, 417 Mich.
268, 276, 335 N.W.2d 641, 645 (1983) ("In construing PERA, this court has frequently
sought guidance from federal court decisions construing analogous provisions of the
NLRA."); but see Paterson PBA, Local No. 1 v. City of Paterson, 87 N.J. 78, 90, 432
A.2d 847, 853 (1981) ("Federal precedents concerning the scope of collective bargaining
in the private sector are of little value in determining the permissible scope of negotiabil-
ity in public employment labor relations.").
46. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
47. See, eg., San Mateo City School Dist. v. PERB, 33 Cal. 3d 850, 863, 663 P.2d
523, 531, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 808 (1983) ("Public entities do not operate for profit, but
must accommodate the needs of their constituents for efficient and affordable public
services."); Michigan Law Enforcement Union, Teamsters Local 129 v. City of High-
land Park, 138 Mich. App. 342, 360 N.W.2d 611 (1984) (bargaining mandatory only if
the proposal does not significantly abridge the employer's freedom to manage his busi-
ness and does not alter the employer's basic operation).
48. See supra notes 19-20 (citing representative management rights provisions).
49. Despite its frequent application, commentators often criticize the managerial
prerogative doctrine because it contravenes the basic policy goal of harmonious labor
relations by deferring to management, and because it fails to recognize the public em-
ployer's role as political decisionmaker. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1689-91.
50. 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972).
51. Id. at 583, 295 A.2d at 536.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 585-87, 295 A.2d at 536-37. The court did find, however, that the impact
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2. Political Process
Many courts and commentators have opposed collective bargaining
in the public sector, arguing that it distorts the democratic decision-
making process.54 Proponents of the political process theory contend
that public sector bargaining gives employee unions undue influence in
political decisions by granting them direct and exclusive access to their
employers, who are elected officials." As a result, the voting public's
opportunity to participate in matters of public policy is compromised.
Courts employing this theory restrict the scope of bargaining to offset
the political clout of public employee unions.5 6
In Ridgefield Park Education Association v. Ridgefield Park Board of
Education57 the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted this position,
holding that representative government would be endangered if gov-
ernmental policy decisions were left to collective negotiation where cit-
izen participation is excluded.58 The court indicated a reluctance to
sanction bargaining over managerial decisions, noting that the true
managers are the people. 59 Similarly, in In re Local 195, IFPTE, AFL-
of this decision on teacher assignments and compensation was bargainable. Id. See
infra text accompanying notes 124-31 (discussing severability of policy and impact).
54. See generally H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES
24-29 (1971); C. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83
YALE L.J. 1156 (1974); Love & Sulnzer, Political Implications of Public Employee Bar-
gaining, I 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 18 (1972); R. Summers, Public Sector Collective Bargain-
ing Substantially Diminishes Democracy, 1 GOV'T UNION Rv. 5 (1980); Note,
Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment, 19 UCLA L. REV. 887 (1972);
Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78
YALE L.J. 1107, 1126 (1969).
Articles that challenge the political process theory include: Wollett, The Coming
Revolution in Public School Management, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1017 (1969); Cohen, Does
Public Employee Unionism Diminish Democracy? 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 189
(1979); Note, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Employee, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
277, 291 (1969).
55. See, e.g., Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J.
144, 162, 393 A.2d 278, 286-87 (1978) (arguing that there would be little room for
community involvement if agreements concerning educational policy matters could be
negotiated behind closed doors).
56. See, e.g., Ridgefield Park, 78 N.J. at 163, 393 A.2d at 287; In re IFPTE Local
195 v. State, 88 N.J. 393, 402, 443 A.2d 187, 191 (1983); West Bend Educ. Ass'n v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 357 N.W.2d 534, 538
(1984); Unified School Dist. No. 1 of Racine County v. WERC, 81 Wis. 2d 89, 259
N.W.2d 724 (1977).
57. 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 278 (1978).
58. Id. at 163, 393 A.2d at 287.
59. d The court held that negotiating the issue of teacher transfers was impermis-
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CIO v. State' ° the same court stressed that matters of public policy are
best determined through public debate, lobbying, voting, and legisla-
tion.61 The court noted that its role in scope questions was to deter-
mine whether an issue should be decided by the political process or by
collective negotiations. 62 The court held that topics which significantly
interfere with determinations of governmental policy are
nonnegotiable.63
In San Mateo City School District v. Public Employment Relations
Board," the school district argued that because collective bargaining
transforms the multilateral nature of governmental decision making
into a bilateral process, California's scope provision should be read re-
strictively.65 The California Supreme Court acknowledged the impor-
tance of public participation in decisions affecting education, but
declined to read the scope provision restrictively. 66 Instead, the court
pointed to provisions in the EERA requiring contract proposals to be
presented at public meetings. This requirement, the court concluded,
gave the public an opportunity to be fully informed and to express its
views.67
3. Nondelegation
The nondelegation theory resembles the political process model in its
focus on the role of the public employer as government. Instead of
emphasizing public participation in policy, the nondelegation theory
stresses that the state legislature delegated certain powers to the public
employer which cannot be "bargained away" to private interest
groups. 8 Proponents of this theory insist that representative officials
sible because bargaining would interfere with the school board's inherent managerial
responsibilities to determine governmental policy. Id. at 156, 393 A.2d at 284.
60. 88 N.J. 393, 443 A.2d 187 (1983).
61. Id. at 402, 443 A.2d at 191.
62. Id
63. Id at 404, 443 A.2d at 192.
64. 33 Cal. 3d 850, 663 P.2d 523, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 809 (1983). See supra note 35
(discussing facts).
65. 33 Cal. 3d at 863-64, 663 P.2d at 532, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
66. Id. at 864, 663 P.2d at 532, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
67. Id
68. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Woodstown-Pilesgrove School Dist. v. Woodstown
Pilesgrove Educ. Ass'n, 81 N.J. 582, 589, 410 A.2d 1131, 1134 (1980) ("If the subject is
a matter which has been delegated by the legislature to the Board of Education, it can-
not be 'bargained away.' "); Bernards Township Bd. of Educ. v. Bernards Township
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alone must make decisions involving traditional governmental func-
tions.69 Therefore, neither the employees nor the employer may nego-
tiate issues of inherent governmental policy.
70
The Maryland Court of Appeals considered whether a school board
could delegate its duty to make tenure decisions to an arbitrator in
Board of Education of Carroll County v. Carroll County Education As-
sociation.71 The court observed that the statutory chain of responsibil-
ity from the General Assembly, delegated through the state school
board to the local school systems, clearly indicated that the local board
had authority to determine tenure.72 Consequently, the court prohib-
ited the board from engaging in arbitration over tenure decisions.73
In Three Village Teachers' Association v. Three Village Central
School District,74 the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
noted that the school district was exclusively responsible for establish-
ing teacher qualifications and selecting applicants.75 The court held,
therefore, that an arbitrator could not challenge the district's nondele-
gable hiring decision.76
Educ. Ass'n, 79 N.J. 311, 399 A.2d 620 (1979); Wycokoff Township Bd. of Edue. v.
Wycokoff Educ. Ass'n, 168 N.J. Super. 497, 501, 403 A.2d 916, 918 (App. Div. 1979)
(decision to retain teacher nondelegable).
69. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire Fighters, Local 21 v. City of St. Paul, 336 N.W.2d 301,
303 (Minn. 1983) (decision to establish an officers training program is a nonnegotiable
traditional governmental function).
70. Courts adopting the nondelegation doctrine hold that governmental policy deci-
sions are "prohibited," rather than "permissive" topics of bargaining. See, eg.,
Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. at 163, 393 A.2d
at 287.
71. 53 Md. 355, 452 A.2d 1316 (1982).
72. Id. at 357, 452 A.2d at 1318. See also MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 6-201(f)
(1985) (providing that the county board shall determine tenure).
73. 53 Md. at 359, 452 A.2d at 1319. See also Howard Bd. of Educ. v. Howard
Educ. Ass'n, 61 Md. 631, 487 A.2d 1220 (1985) (county boards cannot bargain away
matters dealing with the establishment of educational policy).
74. 128 A.D.2d 626, 512 N.Y.S.2d 878 (App. Div. 1987).
75. Id. at 627, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 879. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2573[9] (Consol.
1985).
76. 128 A.D.2d at 627, 512 N.Y.2d at 879. New York courts frequently invoke the
nondelegation doctrine. See, eg., Matter of Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teach-
ers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)
(tenure decision nondelegable); Honeoye Falls-Lima Cent. School Dist. v. Honeoye
Falls-Lima Educ. Ass'n, 49 N.Y.2d 732, 402 N.E.2d 1165, 426 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1980)
(job security of tenured teachers not subject to arbitration); Board of Educ. of Elwood
Union Free School Dist. v. Elwood Teachers Alliance, 94 A.D.2d 692, 461 N.Y.S.2d
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4. Interest of the Student
Courts occasionally exclude topics from negotiation because of their
potentially adverse impact on students." This rationale emphasizes
that the primary duty of a school board is to deliver high quality edu-
cation to its students; therefore, bargaining proposals that interfere
with this duty should not be mandatory.78
The Indiana Court of Appeals adopted this position in Eastbrook
Community Schools Corp. v. Indiana Educational Employment Rela-
tions Board.79 The court conceded that the school calendar affected
the working conditions of teachers, but determined that the calendar's
effect on students outweighed the private interests of teachers.80 The
court held that because the protection of students' interests was the
predominant goal, the school calendar was not a proper subject for
mandatory bargaining.8"
In Ridgefield Park 2 the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed that
transfer decisions affected working conditions.8 3 The court concluded,
however, that the board's duty to deploy teachers so that students
would receive a thorough and efficient education was a nondelegable
891 (1983) (contract provisions interfering with school board's nondelegable function to
determine tenure is unenforceable as contrary to public policy).
77. See, e.g., San Mateo City School Dist. v. PERB, 33 Cal. 3d 850, 863, 663 P.2d
523, 531, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 808 (1983) (public policy renders the welfare of those
receiving the service a primary consideration); Wright v. Board of Educ. of City of E.
Orange, 99 N.J. 112, 121, 491 A.2d 644, 648 (1985) (in determining negotiability, court
focuses primarily on extent to which students and teachers are congruently involved);
Board of Educ. of Woodstown-Pilesgrove v. Woodstown-Pilesgrove Educ. Ass'n, 81
N.J. 582, 592, 410 A.2d 1131, 1136 (1980) (same); Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers
Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 421 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1973) (school year and vacation schedule,
at least where student and teachers are congruently involved, are matters of nonnegoti-
able educational policy); Monroe-Woodbury Cent. School Dist. v. Monroe-Woodbury
Teachers Ass'n, 105 A.D.2d 786, 786, 481 N.Y.S.2d 731, 731 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
(public policy prohibits school district from bargaining away its responsibility to main-
tain adequate classroom standards).
78. Eastbrook Community Schools Corp. v. Indiana EERB, 446 N.E.2d 1007, 1013
(Ind. App. 1983).
79. 446 N.E.2d 1007 (Ind. App. 1983).
80. Id. at 1013.
81. d The court adopted the position taken by the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in Woodstown-Pilesgrove, 81 N.J. at 592, 410 A.2d at 1136 (establishment of school
calendar nonnegotiable where students and teachers are congruently involved).
82. 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 278 (1978).
83. Id at 156, 393 A.2d at 284.
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managerial decision.8 4
5. Statutory Conflict
Finally, courts may determine that a bargaining proposal is outside
the scope of negotiation because it conflicts with a provision in the state
civil service system,85 another statute,86 or a local law." The statutory
84. Id. The court later observed that bargaining over issues of educational policy
would be improper because the interests of teachers do not always coincide with the
interests of the students. Id. at 165, 393 A.2d at 288.
See generally Symposium on Teacher Bargaining, 50 INDUS. L.J. 344 (1974) (discuss-
ing conflicting interests of students, teachers, and public); but see Minneapolis Fed'n of
Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Special School Dist. No. 1, 258 N.W.2d 802, 805
(Minn. 1977) ("Both administrators and school boards, on the one hand, and teachers
on the other, must be deemed to have the interests of the students at heart.").
85. See, eg., Sonoma County Bd. of Edue. v. PERB, 102 Cal. App. 3d 689, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 464 (1980); Wiener v. Board of Educ., 90 A.D.2d 832, 455 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1982);
State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 393 A.2d 233 (1978).
86. Cases holding that the existence of a conflict between a statewide collective bar-
gaining statute and another state statute did not limit the scope of bargaining include:
Michigan Council 25, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. St.
Clair Co., 136 Mich. App. 721, 357 N.W.2d 750 (1984) (despite prosecutor's right
under MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 49.41, 49.42 (1979) to hire and fire assistants at will,
MERC could require negotiation, since grounds for employee discharges are a condi-
tion of employment); Oak Park Educ. Ass'n MEA/NEA v. Oak Park Bd. of Educ., 132
Mich. App. 680, 348 N.W.2d 9 (1984) (where there is a conflict between PERA and
another statute, PERA prevails); Tracy v. Ostego Bd. of Educ., 6 Ohio St. 3d 305, 453
N.E.2d 610 (1983) (bargaining provision requiring nonrenewal notification did not
overly restrict board's statutory right to not renew contracts).
Cases holding that conflict with a state statute does limit the scope of bargaining
include: Bethlehem Township Bd. of Educ. v. Bethlehem Township Educ. Ass'n, 177
N.J. Super. 479, 427 A.2d 80 (App. Div. 1981) (State Board of Education regulations
governing teacher evaluations preempted evaluation proposals submitted by teachers'
association); California Teachers' Ass'n v. Parlier Unified School Dist., 157 Cal. App.
3d 174, 201 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1984) (collective bargaining agreement cannot waive benefits
provided by Education Code); Council of N.J. State College v. State Bd. of Higher
Educ., 91 N.J. 18, 449 A.2d 1244 (1982) (right of public employees to negotiate over
working conditions limited if subject matter is already addressed by legislature).
87. Generally courts have held that a local ordinance or city charter cannot impose
any limitation upon the scope of bargaining. See, e.g., School Comm. of Newton v.
Labor Relations Bd., 388 Mass. 557, 447 N.E.2d 1201 (1983) (provision in city charter
authorizing school committee to discharge employees at its pleasure did not preclude
committee from being required to negotiate over decision to layoff janitors); but see
United Pub. Employees, Local 390/400, S.E.I.U., AFL-CIO v. City and County of San
Francisco, 190 Cal. App. 3d 419, 235 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1987) (amount of compensation
paid to city employees is strictly local affair and is not preempted by general collective
bargaining law).
See generally H. EDWARDS, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 369-
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conflict issue typically arises when the bargaining agent asserts that the
collective bargaining statute mandates bargaining, whereas the school
district claims that another statute, often a state educational code, ex-
empts the topic from negotiations." Occasionally, courts can look to
statutory language that either suggests preemptive intent 9 or resolves
conflicts in favor of the PERA.9°
If no clear statutory directives exist, courts initially attempt to har-
monize conflicting statutes by considering them equally valid.91 If
statutory reconciliation fails, judicial resolution varies. However,
courts frequently acknowledge the contribution collective bargaining
makes to stable labor relations92 and consider bargaining statutes pre-
empted only if there is an emphatic statutory mandate to do so.9 3
The New Jersey Supreme Court established a standard for resolving
statutory conflicts in State v. State Supervisory Employees Association.94
The court held that terms of employment are preempted by other stat-
utes controlling identical subject matter95 if the other statute speaks in
406 (1985) (discussing the effect of civil service laws and other statutory provisions on
collective bargaining acts).
88. See supra notes 85-87 (listing cases).
89. Some state legislatures intend to give civil service laws or other statutes a pre-
emptory effect over collective bargaining laws. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.28
(West Supp. 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.56.100 (West Supp. 1987).
90. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-278(c) (West Supp. 1988); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 89-10(d) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1607, § 7 (Smith-Hurd 1985);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 7(d) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1987). See, e.g., City of Deca-
tur v. Illinois State Labor Relations Bd., 149 IIl. App. 3d 319, 500 N.E.2d 573 (1986)
(relying on ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para 1607, § 7 (1985)).
91. See, eg., Connecticut Educ. Ass'n v. State Bd. of Labor Relations, 5 Conn.
App. 253, 498 A.2d 102 (1985) (requiring mandatory bargaining for layoff procedures is
consistent with public policy of the Teacher Tenure Act); Fraternal Order of Police,
Ionic County Lodge No. 157 v. Bensinger, 122 Mich. App. 437, 442, 333 N.W.2d 73, 75
(1983) (defendant arguing in alternative that court should construe overlapping statutes
so as to give effect to both); San Mateo City School Dist. v. PERB, 33 Cal. 3d 850, 865,
663 P.2d 523, 532, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 809 (1983) (reading language of the Education
Code in harmony with, rather than preempting, EERA).
92. See, e.g., Certificated Employees Council v. Monterey Peninsula Unified School
Dist., 42 Cal. App. 3d 328, 116 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1974) (permitting parties to meet and
confer on tenure matters promotes orderly and uniform communication between teach-
ers and administrators).
93. See, eg., San Mateo, 33 Cal. 3d at 864-65, 663 P.2d at 532, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 809
(unless language of Education Code clearly evidences an intent to set an inflexible stan-
dard, the court should not preclude negotiability).
94. 78 N.J. 54, 393 A.2d 233 (1978).
95. Id at 81, 393 A.2d at 246.
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the imperative and leaves nothing to the discretion of the public em-
ployer.96 In addition, the court held that if the statute merely sets a
minimum level of employee rights, then negotiations regarding en-
hanced employee protection are mandatory. If the statute sets a mini-
mum and a maximum level of employee rights, negotiations may
proceed within these parameters.9 7 The court concluded, however,
that bargaining proposals relating to pension benefits were nonnegoti-
able because comprehensive pension regulations indicated legislative
intent to preempt the field.9s
B. Expanding the Scope of Bargaining
1. Harmonious Labor Relations
A basic legislative goal of collective bargaining statutes is the fur-
therance of equitable and harmonious labor relations. PERA pream-
bles frequently acknowledge the public's interest in stability among
employers and employees who provide public services.99 However,
most public sector bargaining laws deny workers a fundamental eco-
nomic tool that is available to private sector employees - the right to
strike."i Courts often favor expanding the scope of public sector bar-
gaining to ensure harmonious labor relations and to compensate public
employees for the strike prohibition.1"1
96. Id.
97. Id. at 81-82, 393 A.2d at 246-47.
98. ItL at 83, 393 A.2d at 247.
Cases adopting the standard developed in State Supervisory include: Wright v. Board
of Educ. of the City of E. Orange, 99 N.J. 112, 491 A.2d 644 (1985) (no preemption of
negotiability of custodians' tenure rights because statute left school district with consid-
erable discretion); In re IFPTE Local 195 v. State, 88 N.J. 393, 443 A.2d 187 (1982)
(negotiation as to subcontracting not preempted).
99. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-3 (Burns Supp. 1987) (acknowledging that
Indiana citizens have a fundamental interest in harmonious relations between school
corporations and teachers, and that school employers' recognition of their employees'
right to organize and bargain collectively can alleviate various forms of labor unrest).
100. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153(e) (West Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 447.505 (West Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-14 (Burns Supp. 1987);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5423(c) (1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 964(2) (Supp.
1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 160A(m) (1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.202
(1979); NEV. REv. STAT. § 288.230 (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273A: 13 (1987);
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 3-18-10
(1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.89 (West Supp. 1987).
101. See, e.g., Town of Stratford v. Local 134, IFPTE, 201 Conn. 577, 519 A.2d 1
(1986) (holding that public's interest in peaceful adjustment of labor disputes and pro-
motion of industrial stabilization through collective bargaining mandated negotiation
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Michigan courts endorse a broader scope of bargaining in the public
sector than in the private sector. In West Ottawa Education Association
v. West Ottawa Public Schools Board of Education,"0 2 the Michigan
Supreme Court reasoned that because the Michigan PERA prohibits
strikes, a liberal view of what constitutes a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining was appropriate for public sector scope disputes. 03 The court
further expanded the scope of negotiations by broadly defining a "term
and condition of employment" as any matter which settles an aspect of
the relationship between employers and employees."°
2. Significant Relation Test
Another rationale that tends to expand the scope of bargaining is the
significant relation test. This approach suggests that if a proposal for
negotiation is "significantly related" to wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment, it should be mandatory.10 5
The Nevada Supreme Court articulated the "significantly related"
test in Clark County School District v. Local Government Employee-
Management Relations Board."'6 The court determined that a number
of disputes between the school district and the teachers' association
were negotiable, including class size, professional improvement, stu-
dent discipline, school calendar, and teacher performance.' 0 7 The
court held that a governmental employer must negotiate matters signif-
icantly related to wages, hours, and working conditions, even if the
over special compensation); University Educ. Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Minnesota,
353 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1984) (purpose of PERA requires scope of mandatory
bargaining to be broadly construed so that the purpose of resolving labor disputes
through negotiation can best be served).
102. 126 Mich. App. 306, 337 N.W.2d 533 (1983).
103. Id at 315, 337 N.W.2d at 539. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.202 (1979)
(strike prohibition provision); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Detroit, 61 Mich. App.
487, 233 N.W.2d 49 (1975).
104. 126 Mich. App. at 322, 337 N.W.2d at 542. See also Houghton Lake Educ.
Ass'n v. Houghton Lake Bd. of Educ., 109 Mich. App. 1, 6, 310 N.W.2d 888, 890
(1981).
105. Courts rarely examine the relationship of the bargaining item to working con-
ditions in isolation. Instead courts also consider the proposal's effect on managerial
decisions. As a result, this approach has been superseded by the "impact balancing"
approach, which weighs a topic's effect on working conditions against its intrusion on
managerial policy. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (for further discus-
sion of this approach).
106. 90 Nev. 442, 530 P.2d 114 (1974).
107. Id at 447-48, 530 P.2d at 118.
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subject is also related to management prerogatives.10 8
IV. TOWARD A BALANCED APPROACH
Perhaps the most troublesome problem courts encounter when ad-
dressing scope disputes is how to characterize bargaining proposals
that fall concurrently within the meaning of "management rights" and
"terms and conditions of employment.""1 ° 9 For example, decisions re-
garding class size 110 and school calendar 11' involve basic educational
policy, yet also significantly affect teachers' working conditions.
Courts have developed two major strategies for resolving this dilemma:
the severability doctrine and the balancing test.
A. The Severability Doctrine
The severability doctrine accommodates the competing interests of
school districts and teachers by separating the nonnegotiable policy as-
pects of a bargaining proposal from negotiable elements. This is
achieved by requiring negotiation over the procedure' 1
2 and impact1 13
108. Id. at 446-47, 530 P.2d at 117.
Nevada subsequently enacted a list statute which limits the scope of bargaining to a
specified number of enumerated topics. See NEV. REv. STAT. § 288.150(2) (1987).
109. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire Fighters, Local 21 v. City of St. Paul, 336 N.W.2d 301,
302 (Minn. 1983) (recognizing that many inherent managerial policies can concomi-
tantly and directly affect terms and conditions of employment); School Dist. of Drum-
mond v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 121 Wis. 2d 126, 134, 358 N.W.2d
285, 289 (1984) (statutory recognition of employee and employer interests creates diffi-
culties when proposal touches simultaneously on working conditions and managerial
decisions).
110. See, eg., West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d
526 (1972) (class size is a mandatory subject); Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v.
Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1977) (class size is not a mandatory
subject); West Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 315 N.E.2d 775,
358 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1974) (class size not mandatory, but impact of class size on working
conditions mandatory).
111. See, e.g., Eastbrook Community Schools Corp. v. Indiana Educ. Employment
Relations Bd., 446 N.E.2d 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (school calendar decision is within
school board's exclusive managerial prerogative); Board of Educ. v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Comm'n, 52 Wis. 2d 625, 191 N.W.2d 242 (1971) (school calendar con-
stituted negotiable "condition of employment").
112. Cases which deny bargaining over policy but require bargaining over proce-
dure are extremely common. See, e.g., Jones v. Wrangell School Dist., 696 P.2d 677
(Alaska 1985) (nonretention decision not mandatory, but nonretention procedures ne-
gotiable); United Pub. Employees, Local 390/400, SEIU, AFL-CIO v. City and County
of San Francisco, 190 Cal. App. 3d 419, 235 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1987) (amount of compen-
sation is nonnegotiable, but procedure by which compensation is determined is negotia-
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of policy decisions, while preserving the basic policy choice for the
school district.
Minnesota courts have clearly articulated a "severability" test and
frequently apply it to resolve overlap problems.I14 In Minneapolis Fed-
eration of Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Special School District No.
1,115 the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that if an inherent manage-
rial policy decision is severable from its implementation, then negotia-
tion is mandatory with respect to issues of implementation that affect
working conditions. 1 6 In applying this principle, the court held the
decision to transfer teachers was a nonnegotiable managerial preroga-
tive, but the criteria for determining which teachers would be trans-
ferred was negotiable. 17
Similarly, in Kansas Board of Regents v. Pittsburgh State University
Chapter of Kansas-NEA,"18 the Kansas Supreme Court held that final
decisions regarding teacher promotion, 1 9 summer employment, 2
ble); Three Village Teachers' Ass'n v. Three Village Cent. School Dist., 128 A,D.2d
626, 512 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1987) (teacher qualifications); Board of Educ. of Elwood Union
Free School Dist. v. Elwood Teachers Alliance, 94 A.D.2d 692, 461 N.Y.S.2d 891
(1983) (tenure).
113. Cases that deny bargaining over managerial policy decisions but grant bargain-
ing over the impact of policy decisions on working conditions are also extremely com-
mon. See, e.g., United Teachers of Flint v. Flint School Dist., 158 Mich. App. 138, 404
N.W.2d 637 (1986) (decision to eliminate teaching position is managerial prerogative,
but impact of decision to transfer teaching duties from eliminated positions is
mandatory subject); City of Newburg v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 97 A.D.2d
258, 470 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1983) (impact of city's policy to reduce shift manning levels of
fire fighters is mandatory).
114. See St. Paul Fire Fighters, Local 21 v. City of St. Paul, 336 N.W.2d 301, 302
(Minn. 1983); Ogilvie v. Independent School Dist. No. 341, 329 N.W.2d 555, 558
(Minn. 1983); Minneapolis Ass'n of Admin. and Consultants v. Minneapolis Special
School Dist. No. 1, 311 N.W.2d 474, 476 (Minn. 1981).
115. 258 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 1977).
116. Id. at 805.
117. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court has subsequently noted that bargaining
with regard to implementation of policy may proceed only if policy and implementation
are not "inextricably interwoven." See Minneapolis Ass'n of Admin. and Consultants,
311 N.W.2d at 476 (because policy and criteria for determining personnel reductions
were inextricably interwoven, criteria was not negotiable).
118. 233 Kan. 801, 667 P.2d 306 (1983). See Note, Mandatory Subjects of Bargain-
ing Under the Kansas Public Employer-Employee Relations Act, 32 U. KAN. L. REv.
697 (1984) (discussing this case in detail).
119. 233 Kan. at 826, 667 P.2d at 322.
120. Iad
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tenure, 12 1 and reduction in workforce 122 were managerial prerogatives,
but proposals regarding the criteria, methods, and procedures related
to those decisions were negotiable.
121
A second variation of the severability method separates the policy
aspects of a disputed bargaining proposal from the impact of the policy
on working conditions. 124 In City of Beloit v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission,'12 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
school board was required to bargain over the impact of educational
policy on wages, hours, and conditions of employment.1 26 Employing
this principle, the court held that fundamental decisions concerning
calendar days, 12 7 class size, 128 and the initiation of summer school1
29
were not subject to mandatory bargaining, but the impact of these deci-
sions on working conditions was negotiable.' 30  Consequently,
although teachers could not bargain over how many students would
occupy the average classroom or the number of days in the school year,
they could bargain over enhanced compensation for increased class
sizes or additional teaching days. 3 '
C. Impact Balancing
Courts facing the overlap problem increasingly depend on a case-by-
case balancing test which weighs the effect of a bargaining proposal on
working conditions against the burden the proposal imposes on basic
policy decisions. 132 This approach, described typically as a "direct af-
121. Id. at 826-27, 667 P.2d at 322-23.
122. Id. at 827-28, 667 P.2d at 323.
123. Id. at 826-28, 667 P.2d at 322-23.
124. See supra note 113 (listing cases).
125. 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231 (1976).
126. Id. at 54, 242 N.W.2d at 236. The court also held that matters which are
"primarily related" to wages, hours, and conditions of employment are subject to
mandatory bargaining. Id.
127. Id. at 61-62, 242 N.W.2d at 239-40.
128. Id. at 63-64, 242 N.W.2d at 240-41.
129. Id. at 65-66, 242 N.W.2d at 241-42.
130. Id. at 61-66, 242 N.W.2d at 239-42.
131. Id. The court also addressed proposals concerning teacher's files, notice proce-
dures for nonrenewal of contracts, disciplinary standards, layoffs, student discipline,
and in-service training. Using the "primarily related" test, the court held all of the
proposals mandatory. Id.
132. See, e.g., State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 393 A.2d 233
(1978) (bargainable matters are those which intimately and directly affect the work and
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feCt,"' 133 "primarily related," 134 or "material affect' 135 test, resolves
scope of bargaining disputes by determining whether a proposal has a
closer relationship to working conditions or to educational policy. 136
The Kansas Supreme Court first articulated this test in NEA of
Shawnee Mission v. Board of Education of Shawnee Mission Unified
School District No. 512.137 Noting that "policy" and "terms of employ-
ment" were not mutually exclusive, the court suggested that the key to
resolving scope disputes involved weighing the impact of an issue on
the well-being of the individual teacher against its effect on the opera-
tion of the school system as a whole. 138
D. Comprehensive Balancing Formulas
While traditional impact balancing focuses primarily on the compet-
ing interests of employers and employees, courts in California, New
welfare of public employees without significantly interfering with the exercise of inher-
ent management prerogative); Sutherlin Educ. Ass'n v. Sutherlin School Dist., 25 Or.
App. 85, 548 P.2d 204 (1976) (courts should balance the element of educational policy
against the subject's effect on a teacher's employment); Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975) (courts should
balance whether the impact on working conditions outweighs its probable effect on the
basic policy of the system as a whole).
133. School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772,
199 N.W.2d 752 (1972) (bargainable issues should coincide with those matters directly
affecting the teacher's welfare).
134. City of Beloit v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43,
242 N.W.2d 231 (1976). See supra note 126.
135. Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of Educ., 88 S.D. 127, 215 N.W.2d 837
(1974).
136. The "impact balancing" approach and the severability doctrine are similar, but
distinct, concepts. The former method does not separate different aspects of a bargain-
ing topic, but considers whether the topic as a whole has a greater impact on educa-
tional policy or working conditions. However, some courts employ both methods by
initially separating policy from procedure and then applying a balancing test to deter-
mine the negotiability of each aspect of the proposal. See, e.g., City of Beloit, 73 Wis. 2d
at 54, 242 N.W.2d at 236 (applying both methods); Kansas Bd. of Regents v. Pittsburgh
State Univ. Chapter of Kansas-NEA, 233 Kan. 801, 826-28, 667 P.2d 306, 322-23
(1983) (court applies "significantly related" test after distinguishing policy from criteria,
methods, and procedures).
137. 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973).
138. Id. at 753, 512 P.2d at 435. Kansas has subsequently replaced its "impact
balancing" test with the "topics" approach. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5413(L) (1985)
(listing mandatory subjects of bargaining); Unified School Dist. No. 501 v. Secretary of
Kansas Dep't of Human Resources, 235 Kan. 968, 685 P.2d 874 (1984) (holding that
under the topics approach, items "relating to" those enumerated in statute were
mandatory).
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Jersey, and Wisconsin have developed more sophisticated balancing
formulas which attempt to reconcile a wider range of conflicting inter-
ests. These formulas characteristically embody a number of the tradi-
tional theories that courts have developed to resolve scope disputes.
In In re Local 195, IFPTE, AFL-CIO v. State139 the New Jersey
Supreme Court adopted a three-part balancing test to determine nego-
tiability.14° The first prong incorporates the impact balancing ap-
proach, stipulating that a proposal must "intimately and directly affect
the work and welfare of public employees." 141 If a topic satisfies this
step, the court next considers potential statutory conflicts that might
result in preemption.' 42 Finally, the court determines whether the pro-
posal "significantly interferes" with managerial prerogatives related to
governmental policy.143 The court stated that defining "significant" in-
volves balancing the interests of public employees with the require-
ments of democratic decision making."4 This final step, therefore,
incorporates the "political process" analysis, the "management rights"
139. 88 N.J. 393, 443 A.2d 187 (1982).
140. Id. at 403-05, 443 A.2d at 191-93. For a review of scope of bargaining issues in
New Jersey public sector employment law, see Note, Public Sector Labor Relations:
The New Jersey Supreme Court Interprets the 1974 Amendments to the Employer-Em-
ployee Relations Act, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 62 (1979); Comment, After Ridgefield Park
and State Supervisory Employees: The Scope of Collective Negotiations in the Public
Sector in New Jersey, 10 SETON HALL L. Rv. 558 (1980).
141. 88 N.J. at 403, 443 A.2d at 191-92. The court held that all three bargaining
proposals met this first test. Id. at 405, 443 A.2d at 193 (subcontracting decisions that
may result in layoffs); Id. at 411, 443 A.2d at 196 (workweek provisions); Id. at 413, 443
A.2d at 199 (transfer provisions). See also Paterson Police PBA Local No. 1 v. City of
Paterson, 87 N.J. 78, 432 A.2d 847 (1981) (establishing the "intimate and direct affect
on work and welfare" test).
142. 88 N.J. at 403-04, 443 A.2d at 192. The court incorporated the preemption
test established in State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 80-82, 393
A.2d 233, 246-47 (1978). See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing this
test).
143. 88 N.J. at 404, 443 A.2d at 192.
144. Id. The court acknowledged that negotiation will always interfere to some
extent with governmental policy. Id. The requirement that an issue "significantly inter-
fere" suggests a broader scope of mandatory topics.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has subsequently indicated that in determining what
is "significant," the court focuses on the extent to which "students and teachers are
congruently involved." See, eg., Wright v. Board of Educ. of City of E. Orange, 99 N.J.
112, 121, 491 A.2d 644, 648 (1985). Consequently, the New Jersey test implicitly incor-
porates the "best interest of the student" rationale.
New Jersey courts acknowledge that most bargaining proposals pass the first two
prongs of the test, and that the third step is most problematic and determinative. See
Note, Scope of Negotiation After Rapid City, supra note 5, at 136.
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doctrine, and alludes to the theory of nondelegation by the use of the
term "governmental policy." '145
In San Mateo City School District v. PERB146 the California
Supreme Court endorsed a similar three-part comprehensive balancing
formula.14 7 The first prong establishes a more expansive approach than
New Jersey's first step, requiring only a "logical and reasonable" rela-
tionship to working conditions, rather than a "direct and intimate" ef-
fect. 148  The second prong focuses on the public's interest in
harmonious labor relations by recommending mandatory bargaining
for subjects that are likely to create conflicts which could be resolved
through negotiation. 149 Finally, the court allows bargaining so long as
the proposal does not "significantly abridge" the employer's manage-
rial prerogatives and fundamental policy decisions.150
145. The New Jersey Supreme Court has subsequently applied this three-part test to
scope disputes in public education. See, ag., Teaneck Bd. of Educ. v. Teaneck Teachers
Ass'n, 94 N.J. 9, 462 A.2d 137 (1983); Township of Old Bridge Bd. of Educ. v. Old
Bridge Educ. Ass'n, 98 N.J. 523, 489 A.2d 159 (1985); Wright v. Board of Educ. of the
City of E. Orange, 99 N.J. 112, 491 A.2d 644 (1985).
The South Dakota Supreme Court adopted the New Jersey three-part test in Rapid
City Educ. Ass'n v. Rapid City Area School Dist. No. 51-4, 376 N.W.2d 562, 564 (S.D.
1985) (concluding that the New Jersey test provides a more meaningful standard by
which to determine claims of negotiability). See generally Note, Scope of Negotiations
After Rapid City, supra note 5 (discussing this case).
146. 33 Cal. 3d 850, 663 P.2d 523, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1983). See supra text accom-
panying notes 35-37 and 64-67 (discussing other aspects of this case).
147. California's PERB developed this test to assess the negotiability of issues that
are not specifically enumerated in the list of mandatory topics in the EERA's scope
provision. 33 Cal. 3d at 857-58, 663 P.2d at 528, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 805. The court
noted that the interpretation of scope provisions fell within PERB's area of expertise,
and that the court would uphold PERB's construction unless it was clearly erroneous.
Id at 856, 663 P.2d at 527, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
148. Id. at 858, 663 P.2d at 528, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 805. This first prong also pro-
vides for negotiation if the term is logically and reasonably related to a specifically enu-
merated term and condition of employment. Id.
149. Id. See Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J.
59, 62 (1965). The author develops a test from which California's second step may have
derived. Summers would recommend negotiability if the subject is of such vital concern
to both labor and management that it is likely to lead to controversy, and if collective
bargaining is appropriate for resolving such issues. Id.
See Bowles, supra note 5, at 651-52 (advancing the "safety valve" theory which dic-
tates that any subject that might create friction should be aired and brought through
impasse procedures). See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing the
harmonious labor relations rationale).
150. 33 Cal. 3d at 858, 663 P.2d at 528, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 805. This step also serves
to expand the scope of bargaining because only topics that "significantly abridge" man-
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The Supreme Court of Wisconsin applied a similar test in West Bend
Education Association v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commis-
sion.151 The court adopted a "primarily related" standard to weigh the
impact of a layoff procedure proposal on several competing interests.1
52
In deciding whether the proposal was mandatory or permissive, the
court asked if it was primarily related to working conditions, educa-
tional policy, school management, or public policy. 5 ' This inquiry re-
quired the court to balance the employees' interest in timely layoff
notification against the school district's interest in directing educa-
tional and administrative policy, and the public's interest in the polit-
ical process and efficient government. 54  Although the court
acknowledged the district's strong managerial and public policy inter-
ests in the fiscal operation of the school system, it held that the propo-
sal was mandatory because it had a greater impact on working
conditions.' 55
agerial prerogative will be found to be nonnegotiable. See supra note 144 (discussing
New Jersey's "significant interference" test).
151. 121 Wis. 2d 1, 357 N.W.2d 534 (1984).
152. Id. at 8, 357 N.W.2d at 538. See Wis. STAT. § lll.70(l)(d) (1971) (defining
public employer's rights and obligations in regard to collective bargaining).
153. 121 Wis. 2d at 8, 357 N.W.2d at 538.
154. Id. at 9, 357 N.W.2d at 538. The court criticized the initial ruling by the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) for focusing only on the im-
pact of the proposal on the employer, without giving sufficient attention to employees'
interest in working conditions and the public's political interests. As a result, the court
declined to defer to WERC's ruling. Id. at 14-15, 357 N.W.2d at 540-41.
155. Id. at 20-21, 357 N.W.2d at 543. The court noted that the proposals did not
"significantly abridge" the district's powers, and that teachers had an "acute interest"
in the timing of the notice of layoffs. Therefore, the court held that proposals relating to
the timing and effective date of layoffs were mandatory subjects of bargaining. Id.
See generally Weisberger, The Appropriate Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector:
The Continuing Controversy and the Wisconsin Experience, 1977 Wis. L. RaV. 685.
Michigan courts have also developed a comprehensive formula for resolving scope
disputes. It provides that:
Any matter which has a material or significant impact on wages, hours, or other
conditions of employment or which settles an aspect of the relationship between
employer and employee is a mandatory subject, except for management decisions
which are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which
impinge only indirectly upon employment security.
Houghton Lake Educ. Ass'n v. Houghton Lake Bd. of Educ., 109 Mich. App. 1, 6, 310
N.W.2d 888, 890 (1981).
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Critique of the Traditional Limitations to Bargaining
Judicial deference to managerial prerogatives may discourage em-
ployees' legitimate attempts to participate in the construction of a pro-
ductive workplace. Although the management rights theory claims to
promote efficiency by granting management unfettered decision-mak-
ing powers, it may produce contrary results by generating employee
dissatisfaction.'" 6 Allowing public employees to bargain over a wider
range of topics may enhance the effectiveness of the enterprise by pro-
moting workplace morale.' 57 This is particularly true for teachers,
who often measure job satisfaction by the quality of the educational
services they deliver to their students.'5 8 Consequently, excessive re-
gard for management rights undermines the basic purpose of collective
bargaining statutes: the public's interest in harmonious labor relations
and the efficient delivery of public services."'
The managerial prerogative theory, borrowed from the private sec-
tor, fails to account for the unique features of public sector employ-
ment. While recognizing the employer's role as business manager, this
approach ignores the employer's duty as a public servant.160 By con-
centrating primarily on disputes between the employer and employee,
the court neglects the public's right to participate in public policy.
Also, many bargaining proposals are unique to public employment, so
public sector analogies are misapplied.' 6 ' Because there is no exact
156. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1690; Nelson, supra note 5, at 453 ("[B]y
excluding managerial prerogatives, courts may significantly interfere with the basic effi-
ciency of governmental operations."); see supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing this theory).
157. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 455 (observing that involvement and consent are
important to job satisfaction and therefore to the level of employee productivity).
158. See Wollett, supra note 54, at 1030 ("Teachers, by reason of their education,
psychology, and traditions, have an interest in the quality of educational programs.").
159. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1690 ("(S]trict notions of managerial pre-
rogative contravene the legislative mandate underlying public sector bargaining
statutes.").
160. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1691 (arguing that the management rights
doctrine fails to account for the public employer's role as political decisionmaker).
161. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 441 (arguing that application of private sector
concepts and principles to the public sector is not helpful); Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n
v. Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 159, 393 A.2d 278, 285 (1978) ("[F]ederal
precedents concerning the scope of bargaining in the private sector are of little value in
determining... negotiability in public employment.").
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equivalent to student discipline or curriculum in the private sector, the
use of private sector models may result in vague, imprecise judicial
analysis. 1
62
Courts employing the political process model overlook the demo-
cratic nature of the bargaining process itself.163 Employee negotiations
with management can "break the bureaucratic shield" and thereby ex-
pand participation in public policy determinations. 1 6  Collective bar-
gaining embodies the principles of participatory and representative
government by incorporating the views of workers in the decision-mak-
ing process. In the public school context, negotiations may enhance
pluralistic decision making. School boards, who often lack educational
training and rely on school administrators to set educational policy,
could gain additional insights from professional teachers through
bargaining. 1
6 5
Furthermore, the political process model may fail to protect the le-
gitimate rights of workers. Many commentators challenge the asser-
tion that public employee unions wield undue influence by noting that
they have not achieved significant improvements in wages and working
conditions.1 66 These commentators contend that public employees
need collective bargaining to defend against citizens who demand lower
tax rates without diminished services.1 67
Finally, the political process model does not provide sufficient gui-
dance for judicial analysis. Courts may have difficulty resolving scope
disputes if they are required to determine which topics should be sub-
jected to the political process. 168 Such determinations may require de-
162. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 441 (suggesting that because there is no private
sector experience with class size, application of private sector principles may result in
waste of time and energy).
163. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1695 (noting that supporters of bargaining
characterize it as a "system that promotes workplace democracy"). See supra notes 54-
67 and accompanying text (discussing this theory).
164. Cohen, supra note 54, at 194.
165. Nelson, supra note 5, at 468.
166. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 54, at 195 (noting that in many cities, municipal
unions have settled for little or no increase in wages and benefits).
167. See Developments, supra note 9, at 1695; C. Summers, supra note 54, at 1167
("[I]n the political process of budget-making, public employees seeking general in-
creases have few natural allies."); Cohen, supra note 54, at 195 ("[T]he challenge for
public employee unions has been to cope with a backlash directed against their
success.").
168. Nelson, supra note 5, at 466 (noting that "it may be risky business to attempt
to determine which items may become hot political issues").
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tailed knowledge of local politics' 69 and are susceptible to the political
biases of the deciding judge. 170
Judicial reliance on the nondelegation theory places unwarranted re-
strictions on the scope of bargaining.17' This theory justifies unilateral
governmental decisions by invoking the shield of "sovereignty,"'
' 72
thereby allowing public employers to circumvent the statutory duty to
bargain in good faith. Because the nondelegation theory prohibits bar-
gaining over policy decisions, employees may feel excluded from those
issues which most concern them.173 By not recognizing permissive
subjects, this approach denies both parties the freedom to negotiate
voluntarily over policy issues. Excluding permissive subjects under-
mines harmonious labor relations, especially in public education, where
administrators could improve relations by inviting teachers to make
productive contributions to educational policy. 1
74
Furthermore, advocates of the nondelegation theory misperceive the
negotiation process. Management is only required to bargain with em-
ployees, but is not obligated to agree; bargaining gives employees the
opportunity to be heard, not the power to enact laws. 175 Because gov-
ernmental authority is not delegated in the negotiating process, most
courts reject this theory or limit its application to proposals that violate
explicit legislative prohibitions against certain bargaining topics.
B. Comprehensive Balancing Formulas
The comprehensive balancing approach adopted by the California
169. Mda
170. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1698 (arguing that vague statutory defini-
tions of public policy force courts to make "openly political judgments about the appro-
priate balance of power").
171. Bowles, supra note 5, at 656 (arguing that technically, the illegal delegation
doctrine would preclude all public employee collective bargaining); see supra notes 68-
76 and accompanying text (discussing this theory).
172. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1688; Nelson, supra note 5, at 452 ("Sover-
eignty has been used to justify unilateral, inequitable decisions by governmental
administrators.").
173. Nelson, supra note 5, at 453 ("It may be that the excluded nonmonetary items
are actually of greater concern to teachers.").
174. Id. at 454 (citing a poll showing that 90% of Los Angeles teachers felt that
collective bargaining would improve teaching conditions primarily by allowing teachers
to be heard in the decision-making process).
175. Sutherlin Educ. Ass'n v. Sutherlin School Dist. No. 130, 548 P.2d 204, 205
(Ore. 1976); Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n,
572 P.2d 416, 421 (Alaska 1977); Nelson, supra note 5, at 451.
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Supreme Court in San Mateo is an exemplary model for the resolution
of scope disputes."' This approach ensures a careful weighing of the
competing interests while avoiding unnecessary limitations to the scope
of bargaining.
Initially, the court's rejection of a restrictive reading of the list stat-
ute makes unenumerated items potentially bargainable and promotes
the flexibility necessary to accommodate the evolution of labor rela-
tions.'7 7 A literal reading, on the other hand, would stagnate judicial
innovation and invite superficial analysis by limiting the court's role to
categorizing unenumerated items.
The first step of the court's three-part analysis requires a topic to be
logically and reasonably related to hours, wages, or an enumerated
condition of employment. 178 This step substantially reduces the bur-
den traditionally imposed on employees by the "primarily related" or
"material affect" tests, which tend to resolve issues in favor of school
districts unless teachers can make a strong showing of a direct impact
on working conditions.' 79 This minimum level of judicial scrutiny
gives teachers enhanced bargaining ability by broadening the range of
mandatory subjects.
The second step also broadly defines bargainable issues as those
which are likely to generate conflict that could be resolved through
negotiations.' 8 ' This step injects a practical, behavioral element into
the judicial analysis.' Rather than applying artificial labels to bar-
gaining topics, this approach determines whether a topic is mandatory
by examining how passionately employees feel about it.' 82 This step
176. See, e.g., Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973);
Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 37 Wis. 2d 483, 494,
155 N.W.2d 78, 83 (1967); but see Dearborn Firefighters Union v. Dearborn, 394 Mich.
229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975).
177. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text (presenting the San Mateo bal-
ancing test).
178. 33 Cal. 3d 850, 862, 663 P.2d 523, 531, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 808 (1983). See
supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing the court's statutory
interpretation).
179. 33 Cal. 3d at 858, 663 P.2d at 528, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
180. See Bowles, supra note 5, at 658 (arguing that the direct impact test creates a
presumption in favor of a subject being educational policy which has resulted in an
overwhelming number of cases resolved in favor of school boards).
181. 33 Cal. 3d at 858, 663 P.2d at 528, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
182. See Bowles, supra note 5, at 659 (arguing that the impact balancing test skould
be behaviorally restated as, "Would teachers feel strongly enough about this subject to
strike illegally?").
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encourages negotiations by focusing on the fundamental goal of collec-
tive bargaining statutes - the promotion of harmonious labor
relations.
The final step acknowledges the managerial prerogative theory, but
limits its application to items that significantly abridge management's
freedom to make policy decisions."8 3 This approach prevents the un-
justified invocation of the management rights doctrine and encourages
bargaining over a wider range of topics.
The court also declined to accept the political process model as a
limitation to bargaining.184 Instead, the court offered a more produc-
tive solution by pointing to the state's "sunshine law," which requires
the submission of contract proposals to public review and debate. 5
This approach guarantees public participation in the decision-making
process without imposing restrictions on the scope of bargaining.
VI. CONCLUSION
Comprehensive balancing formulas provide a succinct yet thorough
tool for resolving scope of bargaining issues. By incorporating several
of the traditional theories of analysis, courts can avoid the biases that
result from exclusive dependence on one method. This hybrid ap-
proach prevents superficial review of scope disputes by requiring courts
to address a variety of competing interests and by exposing to public
view the detailed reasoning process used to determine negotiability.
Comprehensive balancing formulas, combined with a liberal view of
what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining, can promote equi-
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